Serena Olsaretti.
“Distributive Justice and Compensatory Desert,” Chapter 8 of Justice and Desert, edited by Serena
Olsaretti (Oxford University Press, 2003). Group
3
George Sher.
“Effort and Imagination,” Chapter 9 of Justice
and Desert, edited by Serena Olsaretti (Oxford University Press, 2003). Group 2
Ronald Dworkin. “Sovereign Virtue Revisted” in Ethics 2002. Group 1
Ronald Dworkin.
“Equality,” Chapter 16 of Justice for
Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011). Optional
What I found interesting from Dworkin's luck egalitarianism is that he likened a government safety net to insurance. People buy and utilize insurance as a way to hedge against risks. Yet what this often leads to is people taking additional or greater unnecessary risks because they know that they will not be held fully responsible for the costs. This is known as the moral hazard problem. So people who hold car insurance may drive more recklessly than those who don't, for example.
ReplyDeleteI believe that riskier behavior is not luck - it is a choice that people make. Dworkin's likening of the welfare system to an insurance company helped to make this clear to me. Does Dworkin's welfare state (or any welfare state for that matter) end up encouraging riskier behavior because people know that they have something to fall back on? More importantly, does this happen in real life? "I can make riskier (or even less wise) choices because I know the government will compensate me if these risky choices don't work out."
I am aware that this is probably not the case for a majority of welfare recipients, but that doesn't mean that it is not a problem. I would be interested to hear other's perspectives on this.