Sunday, September 21, 2014

DPI-235 Lecture 6: Libertarianism

Readings:

Robert Nozick. Chapers 1-3, 7 (Section One) and 8 of Anarchy, State and Utopia (Blackwell 1975). Groups 1-3


7 comments:

  1. My reflection on Nozick readings , I Don't have strong economic nor philosophical background,but i work in the field of development focusing on poverty ,so similar thoughts and questions crossed my mind from time to time .

    Nozick ‘s view of minimal state ,is the idea that I totally support .With his opinion of human rights there is also the interaction between individuals that should be protected and to be protected there should be an institute that regulates it to protect people rights .

    So I find that as the only reason I would personally agree for having a state , Im not an anarchist but I consider myself and Nozick as regulated or organized anarchists! Because im not sure if a society was under anarchy would protect individual rights.

    I know that minimal state will require people to pay for this protection the state offers. Having people paying for it through Taxes ,I totally disagree with this thought like Nozick ,firstly because It will be forced which is against individual liberty , secondly protection needed will vary from individual to another yet money will be deducted equally not tailored based on the kind of protection needed! I Prefer creating a self funding system in the minimal state and deal with the state as if its an individual in the society who will have ownership of few resources in the country, I believe minimal state can manage it in terms of generating sufficient funds to stay up and running (self funded state).

    Honestly, I'm not 100% sure if that idea would work,but I'm trying to think about a replacement for taxes !

    Sahar Albazar

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  2. There have been a number of solutions proposed to this. One is a lump sum, like a membership fee (but mandatory). Other libertarians point out that rich people have more property for the state to protect so it is not unfair to have the state levy a fee when they buy houses, cars, boats or start companies. More pragmatic libertarians say that this will in turn lead to too much unproductive administration and tax evasion and that a (low) flat tax is the way to go.

    Using Nozick's argument, I feel he doesn't address the question about how to finance the ultra minimal state in as great detail as he probably should have (he does address issues like this in later, more moderate books). His principle of compensation, that is it is ok to violate rights if you compensate people for it does not wholly convince me as this argument can be used to motivate a much larger state as long as it actually gives people something back for their taxes.

    Then there are people who have suggested financing the state through selling lottery tickets which would take out coercion but at the expense of distorting the gambling market. And of course some say that the only moral way to finance the state is through voluntary donations which I find unconvincing as the functions the ultra minimal state is handling are all crucial ones that cannot be subject to disruption.

    Very interesting topic though! Have you any more ideas about how a self funded state would raise enough revenue?

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  3. If anyone is interested in an anarcho-capitalist response to Nozick, here is Murray Rothbard (Nozick was a socialist in his youth but changed his mind following a long conversation with Rothbard) claiming that Nozick has got a number of things wrong
    http://mises.org/daily/2650

    Also, I feel I have to share this comic, satirizing Nozick in a clever way
    http://existentialcomics.com/comic/38

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  4. There was an interesting discussion about an unconditional minimum wage to move towards the initial "just" distribution that Nozick would have required for his minimal state to be a reality. There is actually a movement within the EU to push such an agenda, but it is currently stalled. Check it out: http://basicincome2013.eu

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  5. Something that I was thinking about today was Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example. In this example, Nozick asks us to assume that an original distribution, D1, was just. Then, people pay money to go see Chamberlain play basketball, which results in him getting a large portion of that money, and creates an uneven distribution, D2, which is also just. What I was pondering was what would happen if we were to relax the assumption that D1 was just. What if, for instance, someone had stolen money, and then gone to see Chamberlain play using that stolen money. Should Chamberlain return this money because it was not originally justly acquired? Should Chamberlain be "punished" for previous unjust acquisitions of money/property, even though his acquisition of such was just? It would be interesting to hear what Nozick would have to say about this, or anyone else on this blog for that matter.

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  6. If Nozick’s understanding of justice and inviolable right are based on liberty, which is closely tied to ownership of property, then wouldn’t the next step be to say that everyone should have a sufficient amount of property to begin with? This evokes the importance of Berlin’s notion of positive liberty. If we accept the absence of coercion as a libertarian definition of freedom, then you cannot rightfully do anything with another's property unless permission is given. From this it may follow that your only guaranteed liberties are a function of the amount of property you have. Someone with no property then may be seen as having no such freedom, while the more property you have, the greater your freedom. Nozick seems to be suggesting that the best way of promoting freedom is to allow some people to have more of it than others, even when this leads to some having very little or even none. At first it is plausible that taking property or holding from someone is a violation of their right to self-ownership, but all forms of socialization restrict people’s freedom in some way, as Nozick accepts. This then leads one to wonder if the issue of what counts as acceptable incursions on people’s negative liberty requires re-evaluation. Nozickean libertarianism ignores the need for a guarantee of baseline social benefits; if one were to take seriously the commitment to liberty, then one would be more tempted to accept some form of the Rawlsian Difference Principle. At least in response to this part of Nozick’s argument, the Difference Principle provides a standard for the arrangement of society, while not necessarily prescribing an overbearing state, such that the worst off would have reasonable prospects for improvement, which in turns allows people to enjoy the kind of economic liberty that Nozick so cherishes. Redistributive measures would serve to enhance liberty by ensuring that the less advantaged have the chance to exercise their liberty fully – only thereafter would free choice kick in, thus no need to assume that the Difference Principle entails correcting for outcome discrepancies. In response to this, Nozick would have to show that the minimal state (coupled with private charity, greater total growth, and other market mechanisms/practices) could provide the greatest benefit to the least well-off, that is, afford him greater freedom than he would have if there were a more incursive, but social minimum-providing, state.

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